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Michigan v. Chesternut and Investigative Pursuits: Is
There No End to the War Between the
Constitution and Common Sense?
by
RACHEL A. VAN CLEAVE*
We must not allow our zeal for effective law enforcement to blind us to
the peril to our free society that lies in this Court's disregard of the
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.1
On December 19, 1984, four Detroit police officers were on routine
patrol in a marked police car. At approximately 12:30 p.m., they noticed
a car pull up to a corner a few blocks ahead. The driver got out of the
car and approached a man, Mr. Chesternut. The two began speaking.
Up to this point, the police officers had not observed anything unusual
about the behavior of either man.2 When the cruiser was approximately
one half block away, Mr. Chesternut looked in the direction of the police
car, turned, and started running away.3 The police then accelerated and
gave chase.4 When the cruiser was even with Mr. Chesternut, the de-
fendant "threw a number of packets from his pocket, . . .went about
another five feet and just stopped." 5 The police officers also stopped,
examined the packets, determined that they contained illegal narcotics,
and arrested Mr. Chesternut. The officers then searched Mr. Chesternut
and discovered a package of heroin and a hypodermic needle in Mr.
Chesternut's hat-band.6
At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Chesternut moved to suppress the
needle and heroin found in the hat-band, as well as the packets of drugs
Mr. Chesternut threw. Mr. Chesternut claimed that the police violated
his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusions when they chased him without reasonable suspicion and that
the evidence obtained was the fruit of this unlawful conduct and there-
* B.A. 1986, Stanford University; Member, Third Year Class.
1. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 513 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
2. Michigan v. Chesternut, 56 U.S.L.W. 4558, 4559 (1988).
3. Petition for Certiorari, app. at 15, Michigan v. Chesternut, 56 U.S.L.W. 4558 (1988)
(No. 86-1824) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
4. No sirens or lights were used, but it is not clear whether the cruiser was so equipped.
Respondent's Appellate Brief at 15, Michigan v. Chesternut, 56 U.S.L.W. 4558 (1988) (No.
86-1824) [hereinafter Respondent's Briefl.
5. Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at 15.
6. Id. at 17, 25-26.
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fore should be suppressed. This motion was granted by the trial court7
and affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. 8 The Michigan
Supreme Court denied the application for leave to appeal.9 The United
States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Michigan courts' deci-
sion, finding that the police did not seize Mr. Chesternut when they
chased him; therefore no fourth amendment issue was raised.1°
In his argument before the Supreme Court, Mr. Chesternut relied on
the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution,' which
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 12
This amendment guarantees the right to be free from unjustified and un-
reasonable governmental intrusions, as well as to enjoy privacy and indi-
vidual autonomy. 13
When a defendant challenges police behavior on fourth amendment
grounds, a court makes two inquiries. The first step is to decide whether
the police conduct constitutes a "search" or "seizure"; if it does not, the
fourth amendment does not apply. 14 If the police conduct does fall
within the realm of the fourth amendment, the second step of the analy-
sis requires a court to decide whether the conduct violates the fourth
amendment.' 5 Thus, in Mr. Chesternut's case the threshold question
would be when, if ever, the police seized Mr. Chesternut. Clearly, the
four officers seized Mr. Chesternut when they arrested him upon discov-
ering the illegal narcotics. The Supreme Court, however, has not limited
the definition of seizure to this traditional arrest situation.' 6 Therefore,
since the arrest was based on evidence acquired during the chase, the
Court had to decide whether there was a prearrest seizure, that is,
whether the police had seized Mr. Chesternut by chasing him. In hold-
ing that the police conduct did not constitute a seizure and therefore
ending its fourth amendment analysis,' 7 the Supreme Court erred. This
Comment argues that the Court should have recognized that the chase
7. Id. at 9-10.
8. People v. Chesternut, 157 Mich. App. 181, 184, 403 N.W.2d 74, 76 (1986), rev'd., 56
U.S.L.W. 4558 (1988).
9. Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at 1.
10. Michigan v. Chesternut, 56 U.S.L.W. 4558, 4561 (1988).
11. Respondent's Brief, supra note 4, at 7.
12. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
13. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928).
14. Chesternut, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4560.
15. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983).
16. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979).
17. Chesternut, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4559.
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was a seizure and gone on to ask the second question, whether the seizure
violated the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court should have used common sense in applying the
definition of seizure, in an effort to maintain broad judicial scrutiny of
police conduct, as dictated by Terry v. Ohio. 18 Section I of this Comment
examines Terry v. Ohio, in which the Supreme Court decided that certain
on-the-street encounters between police officers and citizens come within
fourth amendment scrutiny.I9 Section II traces the development of stan-
dards for determining when a seizure has occurred, that is, when a rea-
sonable person would believe he was not "at liberty to ignore the police
presence and go about his business."' 20 In section III, this Comment ar-
gues that, when the police chase a citizen, their conduct constitutes a
seizure because the citizen is aware of the police's attempt to apprehend
him and is therefore not free to ignore the police. Because this type of
police conduct is a seizure, it must be subject to fourth amendment
control.
Section IV explores the lawfulness of the seizure of Mr. Chesternut.
In other cases, the Court has approached this issue by determining
whether the seizure was reasonable and therefore justified. In deciding
whether a seizure is reasonable, the Supreme Court has balanced the gov-
ernment's need to seize an individual against the invasion that seizure
entails.21 Among the factors weighed by the Court is the governmental
agents' reasons for seizing the citizen involved, and whether these rea-
sons constitute objective facts.22 This Comment concludes that chasing
constitutes a significant intrusion upon a citizen's autonomy. Because a
citizen's attempt to avoid police is ambiguous, such behavior taken alone
is insufficient to justify such an intrusion. Thus, the police violated Mr.
Chesternut's fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusions when they chased him. As a result, the abandoned
narcotics and the evidence discovered in his hat-band should have been
considered fruit of the constitutional violation and therefore
inadmissible.23
18. 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
19. Id. at 16.
20. Chesternut, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4559.
21. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
22. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
23. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961) (proper remedy for fourth amend-
ment violation is exclusion of the evidence obtained thereby-the poisonous fruit); Williamson,
Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of "Stop" and "Arrest," 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 771 (1982).
Williamson explains that a seizure falling short of an arrest could lead to the discovery of
incriminating evidence, and if the seizure does not meet fourth amendment standards, the use
of derivative evidence should not be permitted. _Id at 773-74.
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I. Terry v. Ohio
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court determined that a police
practice known as a "stop and frisk" comes under the purview of the
fourth amendment. 24 Before Terry, courts had assumed that only a full
blown arrest constituted a seizure, and that any police activity falling
short of an arrest did not come within the meaning of seizure for fourth
amendment purposes. 25 The Terry Court stated that the word "seizure"
encompasses a broad range of police conduct, even if this conduct does
not amount to an arrest in the traditional sense. 26
In Terry, Officer McFadden observed two men pacing along the
street, looking into the same shop window and conferring with a third
man.27 After watching this activity for approximately ten minutes, the
officer believed the three men were " 'casing a job, a stick-up,' " and
feared that " 'they may have a gun.' "28 Believing that he should investi-
gate, McFadden approached the three men, identified himself, and asked
their names. When Terry "'mumbled something'" in response, Officer
McFadden spun him around and patted his front pocket. 29 He felt a
pistol and removed it.
McFadden clearly had probable cause to arrest Terry upon discov-
ering the gun,30 but it was McFadden's preliminary conduct that was at
issue. If McFadden's stop and frisk of Terry was unlawful, then the gun
was a fruit of the unlawful activity and subject to suppression. Most
lower courts assumed that, because this type of activity only amounted to
a "stop and frisk" rather than a seizure and search covered by the fourth
amendment, no judicial scrutiny was required. 31 Chief Justice Warren
declined to employ such verbal manipulation and determined that this
activity, although less intrusive than an arrest and full search incident to
the arrest, nevertheless came within the purview of the fourth
amendment.
Although the Court held that the fourth amendment applied to a
stop and frisk, it did not subject this type of police activity to the tradi-
tional warrant and probable cause requirements. 32 Consequently, the
Court did not look for an exception to the warrant requirement, such as
24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). A "stop" is an on-the-street stop and brief
interrogation of a citizen by a police officer, and a "frisk" is a pat-down for weapons. Id. at 12.
25. See LaFave, "'Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and
Beyond, 67 MIcH. L. REV. 39, 43-44 (1968).
26. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17.
27. Id. at 6.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 7.
30. See id. at 7-8.
31. Id. at 9-12; LaFave, supra note 25, at 43.
32. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
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the presence of exigent circumstances. 33 Instead, the Court considered
the fourth amendment's two clauses, the warrant clause and the reasona-
bleness clause, separately.3 4 Chief Justice Warren described police activ-
ity on the streets as "an entire rubric of police conduct," frequently
requiring immediate action by police.35 In most on-the-street situations,
police have no opportunity to get a warrant; to subject this activity to the
traditional requirements of the warrant clause would be impractical and
unduly burdensome. 36 Therefore, Chief Justice Warren tested Officer
McFadden's conduct "by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures" 37 and concluded the conduct
was justified.38 Chief Justice Warren thus struck a compromise between
the competing interests of law enforcement and citizens' fourth amend-
ment rights. The result was to bring more police investigative activity
under judicial scrutiny, while subjecting it to a more flexible standard
than that requiring probable cause and a warrant.
The Terry Court was traveling in uncharted waters and left several
questions unanswered. For the purposes of this Comment, the most sig-
nificant open question is what type of police conduct constitutes a seizure
of the person. Chief Justice Warren stated, "Obviously, not all personal
intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons.
Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority,
has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that
a 'seizure' has occurred.'' 39 Yet he admitted uncertainty as to whether
McFadden seized Terry when he accosted the defendant, before he made
actual physical contact with him.40 Stating that the fourth amendment
applies to seizures other than full-fledged arrests, Chief Justice Warren
wrote, "It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that
person. '41 Chief Justice Warren, however, did not define the type of po-
lice conduct that constitutes restraint of a citizen's freedom. He assumed
33. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
34. Chief Justice Warren explained:
If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether "probable cause" existed to justify
the search and seizure which took place ..... We do not retreat from our holdings
that the police must... obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures
through the warrant procedure... [But] the conduct involved in this case must be
tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures.




38. The second step of this analysis will be discussed infra notes 140-217.
39. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 (emphasis added).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 16.
November 1988]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
that until McFadden physically seized Terry, "no intrusion upon consti-
tutionally protected rights had occurred."'42 He failed to evaluate the
propriety of McFadden's initial approach.
Justice Harlan, concurring, took a different approach. He stated
that before a frisk for weapons may be justified, "the officer must first
have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible
stop."' 43 He reasoned that the right of an officer to make a forcible stop
"must be more than the liberty (... possessed by every citizen) to address
questions to other persons, for ordinarily the person addressed has an
equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away." 44 Justice Harlan
thus acknowledged the need to examine the police officer's initial ap-
proach, but he too failed to define what type of activity results in a forci-
ble stop.
The majority and concurring opinions, taken together, addressed
three levels of confrontation between police and citizens, each requiring a
different degree of justification. 45 The first is the situation in which a
police officer accosts an individual and asks questions. Justice White,
concurring in Terry, declared that nothing in the Constitution prevents
this type of activity.46 The second level is the Terry -type stop, which the
Court determined is not subject to the warrant clause, but which never-
theless constitutes a seizure; this conduct is evaluated under the reasona-
bleness clause. The final level, based on the traditional arrest scenario,
requires a warrant based on probable cause.
While these three categories and their requisite justifications are eas-
ily stated, the problem arises in determining where to place a particular
set of facts. Unfortunately, this determination frequently turns on fine
factual distinctions. The Chesternut Court had an opportunity to estab-
lish brighter lines for the lower courts and the police to use in evaluating
the propriety of certain police conduct. The Court declined to do so,
however, and instead continued its case-by-case analysis, taking into ac-
count the totality of the circumstances. 47 This Comment argues that the
Court should have categorized the police chase in Chesternut as a seizure
and evaluated it under the test of reasonableness.
42. Id. at 19 n.16.
43. Id. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 32-33.
45. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1982).
46. Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
47. Michigan v. Chesternut, 56 U.S.L.W. 4558, 4560 (1988) (Court looks to "all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the incident") (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984)).
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II. Defining a Seizure of the Person
In United States v. Mendenhall,48 the Court held that police behav-
ior should be examined to determine when a seizure has occurred. Jus-
tice Stewart, writing for the Court, statid that "a person has been 'seized'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave." 49 This definition is not lim-
ited to a physical detention of a citizen.50 Justice Stewart explained:
Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even
where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request
might be compelled.... In the absence of some such evidence, other-
wise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police
cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person. 51
These factors determine whether the police engaged in a "show of au-
thority," which is the test for a seizure under Terry.52
Two factually similar cases illustrate the difficulty in applying this
test. In the first, the Court was unable to agree on the issue of seizure.
In the second, because of a fine factual distinction, the Court held that
the defendant had been seized.
In United States v. Mendenhall, two Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) officials observed a woman in an airport and decided that she
displayed characteristics outlined in a drug courier profile.53 They ap-
proached her, identified themselves, and asked for her driver's license
and airplane ticket. She produced these and when asked about the dis-
crepancy between the name on the ticket and that on the license ex-
plained that she "just felt like using that name."' 54 They then asked her
to accompany them to the airport police room for further investigation.
48. 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980).
49. Id. at 554 (footnote omitted).
50. Id.; see Williamson, supra note 23, at 792-97 (arguing that the concept of seizure
includes situations other than physical restrictions of movement).
51. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55.
52. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). See supra text accompanying note 39.
53. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547 n.l. The Court explained:
In this case the agents thought it relevant that (1) the respondent was arriving
on a flight from Los Angeles, a city believed by the agents to be the origin of much of
the heroin brought to Detroit; (2) the respondent was the last person to leave the
plane, "appeared to be very nervous," and "completely scanned the whole area where
[the agents] were standing"; (3) after leaving the plane, the respondent proceeded
past the baggage area without claiming any luggage; and (4) the respondent changed
airlines for her flight out of Detroit.
54. Id. at 548.
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Later, in the police room, the defendant consented to a strip search,
which yielded packets of heroin. The issue was whether the consent to
the search had been coerced or tainted by a previous, unlawful seizure.
These facts generated considerable controversy among the Justices.
While a majority agreed that the evidence was properly admitted and
that a proper analysis considered the factors outlined above, they could
not agree on the result of that analysis. Only Justices Stewart and Rehn-
quist opined that the defendant had not been seized; the plurality as-
sumed that a seizure had occurred. Justice Stewart stated that, when the
DEA agents initially approached her, the defendant did not have "any
objective reason to believe that she was not free to end the conversation
•.. and proceed on her way." 55 Nor did Justice Stewart believe that this
encounter escalated into a seizure when the agents identified themselves
or when they asked for her identification and plane ticket.56 As a conse-
quence, Justice Stewart found that Ms. Mendenhall's consent to accom-
pany the DEA agents to the airport police room was not tainted by the
previous conduct of the agents. 57 He found it irrelevant that the agents
admitted they would have restrained Ms. Mendenhall had she attempted
to leave.5 8
Justice Powell, writing the plurality opinion for the three Justice
concurrence, stated that the issue of seizure was "extremely close," and
he simply assumed that the stop constituted a seizure.59 He then went on
to find that the seizure was justified. 60
The four dissenters criticized Justice Stewart for reversing the case
on grounds not raised in the courts below.61 Justice White argued that
perhaps Justice Stewart had not found any objective fact indicating that
Ms. Mendenhall was not free to leave because the issue was not argued at
the trial court level. 62 Justice White's dissent emphasized the fact-bound
nature of the issue of seizure and concluded that the question is best left
to the determination of the trial court.63
Three years later, in Florida v. Royer,64 the Court was presented
with a situation similar to that in Mendenhall. Two DEA agents ap-
proached the defendant in an airport and asked to see his driver's license
and plane ticket. 65 When the names on the two did not correspond, the
55. Id. at 555.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 557-58.
58. See id. at 554 n.6.
59. Id. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 568-69 (White, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 569.
63. Id.
64. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
65. Id. at 494.
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agents identified themselves and told Mr. Royer they suspected him of
transporting narcotics. 66 Without returning Mr. Royer's license and
ticket, the agents asked him to accompany them to a police room for
further questioning.67 Subsequently, Mr. Royer consented to a search of
his luggage, and the Court again had to determine whether the consent
was the fruit of an unlawful seizure. 68
Justice White, now writing for the majority, applied Justice Stew-
art's standard from Mendenhall, but, in contrast to Justice Stewart's con-
clusion in the earlier case, found that Mr. Royer had been seized. He
stated that the request-for Mr. Royer's license and ticket was permissi-
ble.69 Nevertheless, when the agents retained the documents, told Mr.
Royer they suspected him of transporting drugs, and asked him to ac-
company them to the police room without indicating that he was free to
refuse, they effectively seized the defendant. 70 Justice Powell concurred,
but emphasized the factual differences between Royer and Mendenhall.71
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan placed the moment of seizure at
ad earlier stage of the encounter. He stated that once the officers identi-
fied themselves and asked for Mr. Royer's driver's license and plane
ticket, they "engaged in a 'show of authority' and 'restrained [Royer's]
liberty.' "72 Justice Brennan continued that "it is simply wrong to sug-
gest that a traveler feels free to walk away" in such circumstances. 73 Jus-
tices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented and stated that the defendant's
consent to further questioning was valid because no unlawful seizure had
occurred.74
In both Mendenhall and Royer, the Justices attempted to apply the
factors suggested by Justice Stewart75 to determine whether the defend-
ant had reasonably submitted to a "show of authority" and had been
seized by the officers. The Justices have been unable to agree, however,
on the relative weight of the factors that may constitute a "show of au-
thority," and therefore have failed to apply the Mendenhall test76
consistently.




69. Id. at 501.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 508 (Powell, J., concurring) (here defendant was not free to leave: agents took
Royer's luggage, license, and ticket and brought him to a small, windowless room for
interrogation).
72. Id. at 511-12 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16
(1968)).
73. Id. at 512.
74. See id. at 515-17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 523 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
75. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
76. See supra text accompanying note 49.
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yielded some absurd results. For example, in INS v. Delgado,7 7 the
Court found that an investigative sweep of the Southern California Davis
Pleating Company, in a search for illegal aliens, did not amount to a
seizure. In Delgado, armed and uniformed Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service agents, carrying badges and walkie-talkies, placed them-
selves near the exits of the factory while other agents went through the
factory and questioned employees about their citizenship. Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the majority, applied the Mendenhall standard and
found that the agents' conduct did not amount to a seizure because it
gave the workers "no reason to believe that they would be detained.., if
they simply refused to answer."'78
The Delgado majority ignored the significant facts and erroneously
considered each interrogation individually rather than examining the en-
tire situation as Mendenhall prescribes. 79 Justice Rehnquist's description
of an incident in which one of the agents stationed at an exit attempted to
prevent a worker from leaving is an example of the majority's cursory
treatment of facts in the record. He did not describe how the agent tried
to stop the worker, but noted that the "worker pushed the agent aside
and ran away." 80 In the text accompanying the footnote, Justice Rehn-
quist stated that because "mere questioning does not constitute a seizure
when it occurs inside the factory, it is no more a seizure when it occurs at
the exits." 81
Justice Rehnquist seemed to be addressing the question of seizure,
but did not reconcile the facts of this situation with the Mendenhall stan-
dard. Common sense indicates that a reasonable person would feel that
his or her freedom of movement was restrained when a government offi-
cial attempted to block his or her exit from the workplace. The majority
instead referred to this as an "ambiguous, isolated incident [that] fails to
provide any basis on which to conclude that [the workers] have shown an
INS policy entitling them to injunctive relief.''8 2 Rather than deciding
whether the individual was seized, the Court confused the issue by look-
ing to the relief sought. 83 The majority not only found that no seizure of
the workplace occurred, but also found consent. 84 The Court described
the individual encounters between the agents and the workers as "classic
77. 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984).
78. Id. at 218.
79. Id. at 229 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 218 n.6.
81. Id. at 218.
82. Id. at 218 n.6.
83. Injunctive relief requires a showing of a policy whose continuance would result in
future or continuing harm. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 366-67, 370 (1976).
84. The Court suggested that the workers were not restrained by state action at all: "Or-
dinarily, when people are at work their freedom to move about has been meaningfully re-
stricted, not by the actions of law enforcement officials, but by the workers' voluntary
obligations to their employers." Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218.
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the individual encounters between the agents and the workers as "classic
consensual encounters" because the agents, similar to officers on the
street, were free to accost and question individuals.85
In his concurrence, Justice Powell again found the issue of seizure to
be close86 and assumed that the workers had been seized. He concluded,
however, that the seizure was justified because of the significant govern-
mental interest in detecting illegal aliens and the minimal degree of intru-
sion on the individual.87 Justice Brennan, dissenting, found that
although there was no continuous seizure of the workplace,88 the agents
employed tactics which "demonstrated a 'show of authority' of sufficient
size and force to overbear the will of any reasonable person."'89
Although the Mendenhall standard may be appropriate for deter-
mining whether a citizen has been seized, the Court has failed to apply
the standard consistently, as the preceding cases illustrate. The Court
makes fine factual distinctions and is unable to agree on what "show of
authority" is sufficient to constitute a seizure.
The ramifications of the Court's classification of a police-citizen en-
counter are tremendous. When the Court decides that the encounter
falls within the realm of the first tier, characterized by the police officer's
merely approaching and asking questions, the conduct of the police falls
outside the purview of the fourth amendment. If the Court, however,
decides that the encounter falls within the second tier, which includes
Terry stops, the police activity is subject to judicial scrutiny and must be
reasonable.90
Professor Wayne LaFave argues that an implicit show of force is
present whenever an officer approaches a citizen.91 If the Court were to
accept this proposition, first tier, consensual encounters would no longer
exist because all police-citizen encounters would pass the threshold
"show of authority" test when the officer first approached the citizen.92
LaFave further argues that as a policy matter the police should be able to
rely on a citizen's instinctive willingness to cooperate with the police and
that some additional show of force should be required before the encoun-
ter constitutes a seizure.93 The standard that LaFave suggests for deter-
mining when this threshold has been passed is the point at which the
85. Id. at 221.
86. Id. at 221 (Powell, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 222-24 (compelling governmental interest in detecting the presence of illegal
aliens justified the seizure).
88. Id. at 225 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 229 (quoting Terry v..Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).
90. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
91. W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 9.2(h), at 410 (1987) [hereinafter SEARCH AND SEIZURE TREATISE].
92. See id. at 410-11.
93. Id. at 411-12.
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police behavior could no longer be "viewed as a non-offensive contact if it
occurred between two citizens."'94
LaFave fails, however, to reconcile his proposed standard with his
initial acknowledgement of the implicit show of authority in police-citi-
zen encounters. If this implicit show of authority exists, it does not nec-
essarily follow that citizens cooperate as a result of instinct. It is just as
likely that citizens comply because they do not feel they may simply ig-
nore law enforcement officials. Although LaFave's standard encom-
passes a greater range of police conduct than Justice Stewart's definition
does,9 5 the problem of determining at what point the encounter becomes
offensive still exists. This determination is necessarily fact bound. Fine
factual distinctions in no way aid the officer on the street who must de-
cide if and how to approach a citizen. Furthermore, fact-specific deci-
sions provide lower courts with very little guidance in determining when
a seizure has occurred. 96 If the Court continues to adhere to the Men-
denhall standard, the Justices must apply it consistently, without making
insignificant and often confusing factual distinctions. The better route,
however, is toward establishing bright lines for police and courts to ap-
ply. The Court should categorize specific types of police conduct, includ-
ing police chases of citizens, as seizures. This approach would be
consistent with the policy of Terry and would broaden the scope of judi-
cial scrutiny of police-citizen encounters.
III. Pursuit as Seizure
As seen in both Mendenhall97 and Royer,98 the police do not neces-
sarily have to physically detain a person to have seized him in a fourth
amendment sense. Common sense dictates that when one individual
chases another, it is reasonable for the person pursued to believe that the
other's intent is to overtake and catch her. It is also reasonable, there-
fore, for her to feel her freedom is being restricted.
One of the circumstances that signals a seizure, which Justice Stew-
art listed in Mendenhall, is the "threatening presence of several of-
ficers." 99 Justice Stewart did not define the type of conduct that might be
considered threatening. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Ches-
94. See id. at 412.
95. Offensiveness appears to be a lower threshold than that stated in Mendenhall.
Whether a reasonable person would feel free to walk away is a more difficult standard to apply,
due to the implicit force present in an encounter between police and citizens. LaFave's stan-
dard appears to be more susceptible to an objective determination.
96. Williamson, supra note 23, at 787.
97. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980); see supra notes 53-63 and
accompanying text.
98. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1982); see supra notes 64-74 and accompany-
ing text.
99. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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ternut, stated that "[w]hile the very presence of a police car driving par-
allel to a running pedestrian could be somewhat intimidating, this kind of
police conduct does not, standing alone, constitute a seizure."100 In a
footnote, he continued that a seizure might occur if the police command
an individual to stop. 01 Despite the lack of verbal communication, how-
ever, a reasonable person would feel threatened when chased by police
officers. Even if no sirens were used,102 the vehicle was a marked police
car. Simply by chasing him, the police officers implied that they sus-
pected Mr. Chesternut of wrongdoing. Officer Peltier stated that he did
not intend to capture Mr. Chesternut, but only wanted "to see where he
was going." 103 The Court explained that "[o]f course, the subjective in-
tent of the officers is relevant to an assessment of the Fourth Amendment
implications of police conduct only to the extent that the intent has been
conveyed to the person confronted."'' 4 The Court failed, however, to
explain how the officers communicated their intent only to see where Mr.
Chesternut was going and, further, how a reasonable person could have
understood such an intention when the officers accelerated their car and
pursued Mr. Chesternut. When the police chase a citizen whom they
suspect of criminal activity, that citizen would reasonably believe that
the police intended to catch him, not that the officer only wanted to dis-
cover the citizen's destination.
Although the officers may have been denied their opportunity to ap-
proach Mr. Chesternut when he began running,105 members of the
United States Supreme Court have stated that citizens have a right to
ignore officers.10 6 The Court has not made it a prerequisite that a citizen
first allow an officer to approach him before exercising his right to ignore
the officer. Such a notion contradicts statements by the Court10 7 and
makes meaningless the right to avoid officers.
Justice Harlan explicitly recognized a right to ignore in his Terry
concurrence when he stated that, unless officers have some grounds for
making a forcible stop, the citizen has the right to "ignore his interroga-
tor.' 1 8 Similarly, in Mendenhall, Justice Stewart quoted Justice
100. Michigan v. Chesternut, 56 U.S.L.W. 4558, 4560 (1988) (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 4560 n.9.
102. See supra note 4.
103. Chesternut, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4560 n.7 (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at 25).
104. Id. (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 n.6 (1980)).
105. See People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 71, 378 N.W.2d 451, 464 (1985) (Boyle, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the defendant, by running away, denied the officer the opportunity to
question the defendant), cert. granted, 475 U.S. 1094, cert. dismissed, 478 U.S. 1017 (1986)
(dismissed as moot when defendant died).
106. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 553 (1980).
107. See, e.g., Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553 (A citizen has a "right to ignore his interroga-
tor and walk away.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
108. 392 U.S. at 33.
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Harlan's concurrence in Terry, stating that "'ordinarily, the person ad-
dressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away.' "109
In Royer, Justice White stated that a person "approached ... need not
answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the
questions at all and may go on his way." 110
Two other United States Supreme Court cases also implied a right
to ignore police officers. In Brown v. Texas, 11 two officers stopped Mr.
Brown in an alley without having any suspicion that particular criminal
activity was afoot. 112 Mr. Brown refused to identify himself, and one of
the officers frisked him. After the defendant again refused to identify
himself, the police arrested him for failing to identify himself pursuant to
a lawful stop, in violation of Texas laws.113 The Court found that the
police had not lawfully stopped Mr. Brown and that a seizure occurred
when the officers required him to identify himself despite his initial re-
fusal. 1 14 Furthermore, in INS v. Delgado, 115 the Court stated that "if the
person refuses to answer and the police take additional steps-such as
those taken in Brown-to obtain an answer, then the Fourth Amendment
imposes some minimal level of objective justification to validate the de-
tention or seizure." Thus, individuals have a right to avoid answering
police questions where detention is not justified. Implicit in that right is
the right to avoid being questioned in the first place. To require a person
to wait for a police officer to approach before turning away would sus-
pend the individual's right to go on his way from the time he became
aware of the officer's approach until some magic moment when the right
reappeared.
The notion that individuals have no obligation to permit an encoun-
ter with police to occur unless the police can justify at least a Terry stop
was suggested in a 1974 Louisiana case. In State v. Saia,116 the police
observed Ms. Saia exit a residence that the officers knew to be an outlet
for drugs and pulled their car alongside her. Ms. Saia turned around, put
her hand inside the waistband of her pants, and walked back toward the
109. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-33 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
110. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
111. 443 U.S. 47, 49 (1979).
112. This violates the standard Chief Justice Warren set forth in Terry for determining
whether a stop is justified: the officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intru-
sion." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
113. Brown, 443 U.S. at 49 n.1. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02 (Vernon Supp. 1988)
states: "Failure to Identify as Witness (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally
refuses to report or gives a false report of his name and residence address to a peace officer who
has lawfully stopped him and requested the information."
114. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50.
115. 466 U.S. 210, 216-17 (1984).
116. 302 So. 2d 869, 871-72 (La. 1974).
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residence. The police then exited their car and overtook the defendant in
front of the house. Ms. Saia put her hand to her mouth. The police
thought they saw a, glassine envelope containing heroin in her hand.
They grabbed Ms. Saia, recovered two glassine envelopes (which they
determined contained heroin), and arrested her.117
The Supreme Court of Louisiana described the police action as ac-
tively creating a " 'street encounter' " and found that "[t]he seizure...
occurred when the police officers sprang from their car and overtook the
defendant."118 The court continued that "police cannot approach citi-
zens under circumstances that make it seem that some form of detention
is imminent unless they have... reasonable grounds to detain."11 9 By
quoting Justice Harlan, the court implied that Ms. Saia had exercised her
right to ignore the police and that their attempt to force an encounter
constituted a seizure.
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia recently adopted
this approach in In re D.J. There, the court held that police pursuit of a
citizen constituted a seizure for fourth amendment purposes.1 20 The de-
fendant, D.J., was standing on the street when an unmarked police car
approached. D.J. placed his hands in his pockets and began walking in
the opposite direction. The police then put the car in reverse and drove
alongside the defendant.121 When D.J. changed directions, the car did
the same. The defendant again changed directions, and again the car
pursued him.122 The police then communicated with a second police car,
stating the direction in which D.J. was walking. One of the officers in the
first car got out and approached D.J., who then began running.12 3 D.J.
encountered an officer from the second car, and turned around only to
confront the first officer. D.J. managed to dodge the officers, but ulti-
mately gave up, saying, "Okay, you got me. I'm dirty."' 124 D.J. was
placed on the ground and searched. The officers discovered illegal
drugs.' 25 The lower court denied a motion to suppress the drugs as evi-
dence obtained by means of an illegal seizure. The court of appeals re-
versed.' 26 The court applied the Mendenhall test for seizure, and
117. Id.
118. Id. at 873.
119. Id.
120. In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138, 140 (D.C. 1987).




125. The officers stated that, upon encountering the second officer, D.J. removed from his
pocket a brown vial used to store PCP. D.L denied this, and the lower court did not resolve
this conflicting testimony. Id at 139-40.
126. Id. at 143.
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concluded that a seizure occurred "at the latest" when the officer began
chasing D.J. on foot. 127
By taking up pursuit, the police communicated emphatically to
D.J. that he was not free to leave. This was a communication that no
reasonable person could have misinterpreted .... [The person pur-
sued] knows also that in effecting his capture, the police will resort to
physical force if necessary. When the chase commences, the stop has
begun. 12 8
The court went on to find that the seizure of D.J. was not justified be-
cause flight, by itself, is an unreliable indicator of guilt.129
While the Court in Chesternut did not deny that citizens have a
right to ignore police presence, it failed to reconcile this right with the
ultimate finding that no seizure of Mr. Chesternut had occurred. I 30 The
Court applied Justice Stewart's standard of whether "a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave," yet the Justices did
not explain how they reached their conclusion that a reasonable person
in Mr. Chesternut's position would have felt free to leave. 31 The Court
seemed to require more than acceleration and pursuit to find that a
seizure occurred. Justice Blackmun stated that the officers did not com-
mand Mr. Chesternut to stop, nor did they turn on the siren and lights,
display any weapons, or "operate the car in an aggressive manner to
block respondent's course or otherwise control the direction or speed of
his movement."1 32 The Court did not mention the fact that Mr. Ches-
ternut was running down an alley, with the police on one side of him and
a building wall on the other. This situation made it unnecessary for the
police to operate their car in the manner described by the Court.
Professor LaFave asserts that when a person "indicate[s] his lack of
consent by ignoring the officer's summoning or by leaving [the officer's]
presence . . . police efforts to renew the encounter constitute a
seizure."1 33 When Mr. Chesternut ran, he exercised his right to leave the
presence of the officers. When the officers nevertheless chased Mr. Ches-
ternut, they attempted to force an encounter and thus seized him.
Notwithstanding the Court's conclusion that the police did not control
Mr. Chesternut's speed, the police forced him to continue running in
order to exercise his right to "ignore the police presence and go about his
business." 34
If a police chase of an individual is not considered to be a seizure, it
127. Id. at 140.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 143. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
130. Michigan v. Chesternut, 56 U.S.L.W. 4558, 4559 (1988).
131. Id. at 4560 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
132. Id.
133. SEARCH AND SEIZURE TREATISE, supra note 91, at 408.
134. Chesternut, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4559.
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must somehow come under the first tier of police-citizen encounters. The
activity of the officers, however, clearly goes beyond the threshold stated
in Mendenhall. A reasonable person, having already decided to avoid
the police, would feel restrained when the officers nevertheless chased
her. This conduct also goes beyond LaFave's threshold of "non-offensive
contact."' 135 Rather than allowing a case-by-case analysis of situations
like this, the Court should have stated that a seizure occurs whenever the
police chase a citizen, and that this seizure must be reasonable. 136
The Court, however, declined to draw such a bright line. 137 By call-
ing the chase "investigatory" and not a seizure, the Court violated the
policy stated by Chief Justice Warren in Terry. The Chief Justice recog-
nized the danger in making distinctions based on labels, which later may
become too technical. He stated that such an approach "seeks to isolate
from constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between the
policeman and the citizen." 138 He continued that "the sounder course is
to recognize that the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by
agents of the public upon personal security, and to make the scope of the
particular intrusion ... a central element in the analysis of reasonable-
ness." 139 Chief Justice Warren advocated a more sensible approach to
defining terms such as search and seizure, rather than relying on techni-
cal rules. Common sense indicates that when an officer seeks to force a
confrontation with a citizen by chasing him, the officer has intruded
upon the citizen's personal security, and that such intrusion occurs the
moment the police begin the chase.
IV. Reasonableness of the Seizure
Because this Comment finds that Mr. Chesternut was seized, it con-
tinues the fourth amendment analysis by questioning the reasonableness
of the officers' seizure of Mr. Chesternut. In Terry, the Court based its
departure from the fourth amendment's warrant clause and its decision
to test this type of on-the-street police conduct "by the fourth amend-
ment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures"' 4 on two grounds. First, it recognized that this type of police
activity "necessarily [requires] swift action [and is] predicated upon the
on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat." 141 Second, the more
flexible reasonableness test promotes the safety interest of the officer who
135. SEARCH AND SEIZURE TREATISE, supra note 91, at 413.
136. See infra notes 140-217 and accompanying text.
137. Chesternut, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4560.
138. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968).
139. Id at 18 n.15.
140. Id at 20; see supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
141. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
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stops a citizen by allowing the officer to frisk the citizen for weapons. 142
With respect to analyzing the seizure, however, the Court emphasized
the need for immediate action.143
In setting out the test for reasonable police conduct, Terry relied on
Camara v. Municipal Court. 144 Camara required the balancing of the
government's need to seize against the personal invasion such conduct
entails. 14 5 Justice Powell, in Mendenhall, distilled the factors to be con-
sidered in this balancing: "(i) the public interest served by the seizure,
(ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion, and (iii) the objective facts
upon which the law enforcement officer relied in light of his knowledge
and expertise."' 146
A. Public Interest
The first factor considered in a reasonableness analysis is the public
interest served by the police conduct. The United States Supreme Court
has not expressly specified the type of public interest that justifies a stop.
Neither has the Court ever "suggested that all law enforcement objec-
tives, such as the investigation of possessory offenses, outweigh the indi-
vidual interests infringed upon."'' 47 In Chesternut, the officer's objective
was to see where the defendant was going. 148 Even if the police conduct
can be characterized as furthering an interest in detecting and appre-
hending those in possession of illegal narcotics, this Comment argues
that such an interest is too attenuated and therefore insufficient to justify
chasing an individual, especially without any evidence other than avoid-
ing meeting the police.
Some scholars have stated that the Terry doctrine should be limited
to investigations for serious offenses, rather than serving a general public
interest in crime prevention. The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Pro-
cedure allows a stop if the suspected offense is one "involving danger of
forcible injury to persons or of appropriation of or damage to prop-
erty."' 149 Similarly, Judge Friendly expressed concern about allowing of-
142. Id. at 23-24.
143. Id.; see Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 73 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
144. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In Camara, the Supreme Court refused to allow a warrantless
search of defendant's house for housing code violations. The Court stated, however, that a
warrant could be obtained without probable cause. In the interest of detecting housing code
violations, an inspector need only show that the "reasonable legislative or administrative stan-
dards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied," in order to obtain a search warrant. Id.
at 538.
145. Id. at 536-37; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
146. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
147. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 689 n.1 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (stop
justified when defendants suspected of transporting drugs on a large scale).
148. Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at 25.
149. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(1)(a)(i) (1975) [hereinaf-
ter MODEL CODE].
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ficers to stop citizens suspected of possessory offenses in Williams v.
Adams.' 50 In that case, the defendant had been searched for weapons
based on an informant's tip.151 Judge Friendly emphasized the limited
nature of Terry, which allows police to act on less than probable cause in
situations requiring immediate action. He feared that "instead of the
stop being the object and the protective frisk an incident thereto, the
reverse will be true." 152 The Supreme Court, however, upheld the
search. 53 Nevertheless, Professor LaFave has suggested that Adams
may fit within the Model Code's definition due to the danger of injury
that exists when an officer believes a citizen may possess a gun.' 54 An
individual's possession of illegal narcotics involves no such danger of im-
mediate physical injury and therefore does not require immediate action
on the part of the officer.
The authors of the Model Code also recognized the need to remove
the temptation of police to go on "fishing expeditions for contraband"155
and stated that the best way to curb police abuse would be to completely
remove narcotics offenses from the scope of the Terry doctrine.15 6 Nev-
ertheless, when the Supreme Court has allowed stops for investigation of
offenses not falling under the Model Code definition, it has based its deci-
sions on compelling interests such as the need to curb large-scale drug
trafficking 157 and the influx of illegal aliens.' 58 Both of these situations
involve criminal activity of national concern, and the officials conducting
the stops are specially trained so as to avoid infringement of citizens'
rights. 159 A single citizen possessing drugs on the street does not pose
the same danger as those people transporting large quantities of narcot-
ics. The type of police activity in Chesternut is different from that in
Mendenhall and Royer because in airport stops, DEA agents act in ac-
cordance with characteristics outlined in drug courier profiles; these
guidelines effectively limit the agents' discretion1 6°
150. Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting), rev'd,
441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), aff'd, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
151. Id. at 31.
152. Id. at 38. Although the issue inAdams was whether the search for the gun based on
an informant's tip was justified, as Justice Harlan stated in Terny, the officer must first have
grounds to make a stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
153. Adams, 407 U.S. at 148.
154. SEARCH AND SEIZURE TREATISE, supra note 91, § 9.2(c), at 359 (citing MODEL
CODE, supra note 149, at § 110.2(1)(a)(i)).
155. SEARCH AND SEIZURE TREATiSE, supra note 91, § 9.2(d), at 361.
156. Id. (citing MODEL CODE, supra note 149, at 278).
157. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
158. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 222-24 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (permitting
"investigative sweep" of factory by INS); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418-19 (1981)
(permitting a vehicle stop by the Border Patrol).
159. DEA agents are provided with drug courier profiles, which limit their discretion. See
supra note 53.
160. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.1 (1980); see supra note 53.
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In Chesternut, however, when the defendant looked toward the po-
lice and then ran away, he did not suggest to the police that he was
involved in any specific criminal activity. Therefore, only the most gen-
eral crime prevention interest could have been served by chasing Mr.
Chesternut. Even if such an interest is valid, it still must be considered in
conjunction with the two other factors examined by the courts: the na-
ture of the intrusion and the objective facts supporting the police
suspicion.
B. Nature of the Intrusion
Even if a public interest arguably exists in curbing the type of pos-
sessory offense involved in Chesternut, the nature of the intrusion must
be "carefully tailored to its underlying justification."' 161 In Terry, the
Court permitted a "patting down" of the defendant for the purpose of
determining whether he had a gun.' 62 Subsequently, the Court has
stated that "the investigative methods employed should be the least in-
trusive means reasonably available"'163 to the officer. One of the officers
in Chesternut testified that he and his partners chased Mr. Chesternut
because they wanted "to see where he was going."' 64 Mr. Chesternut's
attorney suggested that following the defendant, rather than accelerating
and giving chase, would have been less intrusive. 165 Following would
have enabled the police to accomplish their objective of observing Mr.
Chesternut, less intrusively.
Because a distinction between following and chasing determines
whether an individual has been seized, a variation of the Mendenhall
standard may be employed to define this distinction. When the conduct
of the police reaches a threshold at which a reasonable person who is
aware of this conduct would believe police contact or capture to be immi-
nent, the police are no longer following, but are chasing, that individual.
This standard takes into account Professor LaFave's observation that an
implicit show of force is present when the police approach individuals. 166
Although a reasonable person may feel intimidated or apprehensive
when a police officer is present, or is walking or driving nearby and ob-
serving the actions of citizens, the officer's conduct does not amount to a
chase until a reasonable person would believe his or her own capture was
imminent.
Analyzing In re D.J. 167 with respect to this standard is helpful.
161. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
162. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1968).
163. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
164. Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at 25.
165. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 4, at 9, 28.
166. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
167. 532 A.2d 138 (D.C. 1987); see supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
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Under the test suggested by this Comment, the police conduct of driving
back and forth alongside the defendant, while annoying and possibly
causing anxiety, was not a seizure. Once one of the officers got out of the
car and approached D.J., however, he seized the defendant. The fact
that D.J. began running first is immaterial; he was simply exercising his
right to avoid the officer.168
The above standard does not permit police to follow at an increased
speed to keep up with the citizen seeking to avoid police contact, for this
would constitute chasing. Once the police increase their speed, they be-
gin a pursuit that must be justified. According to this standard, the po-
lice conduct in Chesternut constituted a seizure the moment the police
accelerated and commenced pursuit and Mr. Chesternut was aware of
this conduct. Allowing police to chase, when a less intrusive method of
investigation is available, ignores the right citizens possess to avoid con-
tact with the police, because chasing forces an encounter. 169 Because
chasing is a grave intrusion on an individual's autonomy, it should not be
permitted when the public interest is weak or attenuated-such as when
the police merely want to ascertain the individual's destination-unless
the police can point to objective facts to justify their interest.
C. Objective Facts Relied upon by the Police
Terry requires that an officer "be able to point to specific and articul-
able facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion." 170 The facts observed by the officer
must objectively indicate the possibility of criminal activity. Otherwise,
police will rely solely on their instincts, and the danger of arbitrary intru-
sions will be greater. 171
In Chesternut, the sole fact relied upon by the police was Mr. Ches-
ternut's flight, which they perceived as an attempt to avoid contact with
the police.172 Flight or avoidance on the part of citizens in response to
the presence of government officials is an especially difficult factor to
evaluate. Allowing police to justify stopping or chasing a citizen solely
because the individual attempted to avoid police belies the proposition
that citizens are free to ignore police. 173 If the courts accept such a justi-
fication by the police, they necessarily fail to support the rights of a citi-
zen who sought to avoid police contact, but was nevertheless
apprehended precisely because she attempted to exercise this right. The
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has stated that "[t]o permit
168. See supra notes 105-36 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 97-139.
170. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
171. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1978).
172. See Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at 5-6.
173. See supra notes 105-29 and accompanying text.
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such justification would be effectively to create a duty to respond to the
police, and would seriously intrude upon the liberty and privacy interests
which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect."' 174 While it is
therefore inappropriate to allow police to base their pursuit solely on an
individual's flight, such a reaction is relevant and should be counted as
one factor in determining whether to chase. Thus, Professor LaFave
states that "[i]t is not to be doubted that such reactions may be taken into
account by the police and that together with other suspicious circum-
stances these reactions may well justify a stopping for investigation."'175
The Supreme Court has recognized that such behavior is an important
factor. In Peters v. New York, 176 a companion case to Terry, the Court
upheld a seizure and pat down of Mr. Peters by Officer Lasky, who had
reason to believe that the defendant was attempting a burglary. The
Court stated that "deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach
of strangers or law officers are a strong indicia of mens rea."'17 7 It is
important to note that Mr. Peters' conduct, taken with other "specific
knowledge on the part of the officer,"' 178 related to the specific crime of
burglary. In contrast, the police in Chesternut were unable to point to
specific criminal activity of which they suspected Mr. Chesternut; rather,
the only reason they chased him was because he initially tried to avoid
them. 17 9
The Supreme Court of Colorado, faced with a case factually similar
to Chesternut, declined to permit police to justify a stop solely on an
individual's evasive behavior. In People v. Thomas, 180 two narcotics of-
ficers were on routine patrol in Denver when they saw Mr. Thomas
standing in a parking lot. One of the officers testified that he made eye
contact with the defendant, who then turned, put his hand in his pocket,
and ran toward a shack. 18  The officers pursued Mr. Thomas because
they believed that he "was either trying to hide something [or] had some-
thing on him."' 82 The officers stopped their car and began chasing the
defendant on foot into the shack. One of the officers saw Mr. Thomas
throw something into a pitcher on top of a vending machine. They then
ordered him to stop, drew their guns, and recovered six balloons of co-
caine from the pitcher. 18 3
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld suppression of the evidence as
174. In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138, 142 (D.C. 1987).
175. SEARCH AND SEIZURE TREATISE, supra note 91, § 9.3(c), at 448.
176. Sibron v. New York 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1968) (consolidating Peters v. New York).
177. Id. at 66.
178. Id.
179. Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at 5-6.
180. 660 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Colo. 1983).
181. The officer stated that this shack was a gambling establishment. Id.
182. Id. at 1274.
183. Id.
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the product of an illegal seizure of Mr. Thomas.184 The court indicated
that the police must be able to justify their pursuit of Mr. Thomas and
quoted a Massachusetts case:
Stops provoke constitutional scrutiny because they encumber one's
freedom of movement. Pursuit that appears designed to effect a stop is
no less intrusive than a stop itself. In other words, the officer's right to
pursue when a stop appears imminent can be no broader than his right
to stop. Thus, the suspicion must be reasonable before the pursuit be-
gins. Were the rule otherwise, the police could turn a hunch into a
reasonable suspicion by inducing the conduct justifying the suspi-
cion .... [A] stop starts when pursuit begins.185
This implies that police pursuit of a citizen is a seizure that must meet
the requirements of Terry by a showing of "articulable facts" giving rise
to "reasonable suspicion." The officers' suspicion was aroused solely by
Mr. Thomas' "furtive gesture." The court stated this was insufficient to
justify the chase because "[tihe problem with the so-called 'furtive ges-
ture' as the basis for a stop is its inherent ambiguity." 18 6 Absent other
factors observed by the police, such citizen conduct does not point to any
particular wrongdoing and may be motivated by a number of reasons,
"from an unsettling feeling of being watched to an avoidance of what
might be perceived as a form of harassment." 1 7
The court, however, recognized that when efforts to avoid the police
are "coupled with an officer's specific knowledge connecting that person
to some other action or circumstance indicative of criminal conduct...
the evasive action, whether running or otherwise, takes on a sufficiently
suspicious character to justify a stop. s18 8 People v. Thomas expressly
overruled an earlier Colorado case, People v. Waits, 18 9 in which furtive
gestures and the defendant's presence in a high crime area were found to
be sufficient to arouse reasonable suspicion to justify a seizure.
In Commonwealth v. Thibeau, 190 the Massachusetts case cited by
the Thomas court, the defendant was riding a bicycle when two police
cars pulled up beside him based upon their belief that many drug transac-
tions were carried out by individuals on bicycles. The defendant turned
sharply down another street. One of the police cars turned on its siren
and began chasing the defendant.1 91 When the car caught up with him,
the officer reached out and forced the defendant and his bicycle to the
184. Id. at 1277.
185. Id. at 1275 (quoting Commonwealth v. Thibeau, 384 Mass. 762, 764, 429 N.E.2d
1009, 1010 (1981)).
186. Id. at 1275.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1275-76.
189. 196 Colo. 35, 38-39, 580 P.2d 391, 393-94 (1978) (stopping defendant's car reasonable
when he made an abrupt and evasive maneuver, though it did not constitute a traffic violation).
190. 384 Mass. 762, 763, 429 N.E.2d 1009, 1010 (1981).
191. Id.
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sidewalk.1 92 The police then searched the defendant and discovered en-
velopes containing herbs laced with PCP. 193 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts found that the seizure of Mr. Thibeau was not
justified.194 In evaluating the reasonableness of the police conduct in-
volved, the court stated that "the defendant's flight from the officer's pur-
suit," without more, could not justify the chase.1 95 The court noted,
however, that a citizen's efforts to avoid police "combined with other cir-
cumstances" could justify a stop. 196 In re D.J., 197 discussed above, also
recognized the unreliability of flight, by itself, as an indicator of guilt.
The D.J. court stated that a citizen's efforts to avoid police must "be
corroborated by other suspicious circumstances." 198
In People v. Shabaz, 199 the Michigan Supreme Court also recognized
that furtive conduct and an attempt to avoid the police must be accompa-
nied by other suspicious circumstances before a seizure is justified. It
refined the standard, however, by holding that facts such as the time of
night and the high incidence of arrests for concealed weapons and nar-
cotics offenses in the particular building from which the defendant
emerged, even combined with his flight, were insufficient to justify the
seizure.200 At approximately 9:00 p.m., the officers were on patrol in an
unmarked police car when they saw the defendant leave the building car-
rying a brown paper bag.201 Mr. Shabaz looked in the direction of the
police car and began " 'stuffing a paper bag like under his vest,'" or" 'in
his pants.' "202 The police car slowed down and passed Mr. Shabaz.
When the car was coming to a stop, the defendant took off running. 20 3
The police put the car in reverse and pursued the defendant, first in the
car and then on foot. Mr. Shabaz entered a doorway, but was physically
seized by one of the officers upon exiting.2°4 The officers then discovered
a gun in a brown paper bag in the doorway and arrested Mr. Shabaz. 20 5
The court found that the defendant had been seized when the officers
pursued him20 6 and that the seizure was not justified based upon an as-
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 763-64, 429 N.E.2d at 1010.
195. Id. at 764, 429 N.E.2d at 1010.
196. See id.
197. 532 A.2d 138, 141 (D.C. 1987); see supra notes 120-35 and accompanying text.
198. 532 A.2d at 142 (quoting Watkins v. State, 288 Md. 597, 603-04, 420 A.2d 270, 273
(1980)).
199. 424 Mich. 42, 62, 378 N.W.2d 451, 460 (1985), cert. granted, 475 U.S. 1094, cert.
dismissed, 478 U.S. 1017 (1986) (dismissed as moot when the defendant died).
200. Id. at 60-61, 378 N.W.2d at 459-60.




205. Id. at 48, 378 N.W.2d at 453.
206. Id. at 59, 378 N.W.2d at 458.
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sessment of the "whole picture."20z 7 The evidence discovered was sup-
pressed as the fruit of an illegal seizure.208
The above cases indicate a trend that requires officers to demon-
strate factors beyond a citizen's attempt to avoid police contact to justify
stopping that individual. This trend reflects a general recognition of a
citizen's right to ignore an officer without having to wait for the officer to
approach him. 20 9 In addition, this trend indicates a desire to discourage
police harassment and abuse.
The Massachusetts court expressed an additional concern in Com-
monwealth v. Thibeau,2 10 in which the court noted the possibility that the
police would "induc[e] the conduct justifying the suspicion." A Califor-
nia case, People v. Aldridge,211 illustrates this problem. The officer in-
volved in Aldridge admitted that he made a practice of stopping and
questioning anyone he found in a particular liquor store parking lot.2 12
He stated that this lot was frequently used for drug transactions and that
people in the lot were usually armed.213 In this particular case, as the
officer approached the lot, the defendant slowly walked away, then began
running, and was subsequently stopped. The court stated that "[i]n this
case, avoiding contact with the police was the only means by which the
individuals... could protect their right of privacy. 214 The court went
on to find that the seizure was not justified by the fact that the defendant
attempted to avoid the police.215
To effectively preserve a citizen's right to ignore police officers, the
United States Supreme Court must require police to point to factors
other than flight, furtive gestures, or avoidance. This would be consis-
tent with earlier Supreme Court dicta. In Florida v. Roer,216 the Court
stated that a citizen "may not be detained even momentarily without
reasonable, objective grounds ... ; and his refusal to listen or answer
does not, without more, furnish those grounds." Justice Harlan, in his
Terry v. Ohio concurrence, stated that citizens have a right to ignore po-
lice interrogation that is not supported by reasonable suspicion.217 This
right does not depend upon the manner in which a citizen exercises it.
Whether an individual ducks at the sight of police, turns, runs, or walks
207. Id. at 65, 378 N.W.2d at 461.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138 (D.C. 1987); People v. Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d 473,
674 P.2d 240, 198 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1984); People v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272 (Colo. 1983).
210. 384 Mass. 762, 764, 429 N.E.2d 1009, 1010 (1981).
211. 35 Cal. 3d 473, 674 P.2d 240, 198 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1984).
212. Id. at 476, 674 P.2d at 241, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 479, 674 P.2d at 243, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
215. Id., 674 P.2d at 242-43, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
216. 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1982) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 556
(1980)).
217. 392 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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away, he or she has decided to avoid a confrontation with the police.
When the police have no other grounds upon which to justify a seizure of
a citizen, they must respect this right and leave the person alone. This
does not intrude upon legitimate police patrol, because police would still
be allowed to follow individuals, as well as to employ other methods of
investigation.
The Supreme Court has not defined the relative weight to be given
to these factors-public interest, nature of intrusion, and facts relied
upon. Assuming that they are of equal weight, the seizure of Mr. Ches-
ternut was unreasonable. The public interest served by detecting posses-
sory offenses or by discovering the destination of a citizen is minimal.
Chasing a citizen constitutes a grave intrusion, especially when compared
to merely following him. Such an intrusion must be justified by more
than an officer's reliance on a single, ambiguous perception. Therefore,
the seizure of Mr. Chesternut was not sufficiently justified, and the
Supreme Court should have affirmed the suppression of the fruits of the
police conduct.
Conclusion
The issue of seizure in the context of police-citizen encounters is a
complex one due to the variety of situations involved. The Supreme
Court must apply a definition of seizure that encompasses a broad range
of confrontations in order to comply with the policies espoused in Terry.
A police chase of a citizen represents one aspect of this problem. This
type of activity would cause a reasonable person to believe physical ap-
prehension was imminent; therefore, it must be considered a seizure.
Fine factual distinctions should be left to the second step, in which the
Court determines the reasonableness of the seizure. Although defining
seizure to include chasing will not completely solve the problems in ap-
plying the seizure doctrine, such a step would reaffirm Justice Clark's
statement that "[t]here is no war between the Constitution and common
sense."218
In order to make a citizen's right to ignore officials meaningful, a
seizure based solely on the citizen's attempt to avoid an officer should not
be permitted. Requiring factors other than flight or avoidance at the
sight of officers would not hamper police officers' duties. The police
should not chase an individual if they cannot point to other, more objec-
tive factors to support that chase. Police could simply follow an individ-
ual without creating the same type of fear and anxiety, or they could
employ other methods of investigation. It is important for the Court to
establish guidelines that limit an officer's discretion in order to protect
218. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
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every citizen's right to be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusions.

